To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the question. A problem for the transcendental argument for free will
A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting...
| Permalink: | http://skupnikatalog.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001060267 |
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| Matična publikacija: |
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) 15 (2019), 2 ; str. 13-32 |
| Glavni autori: | Elzein, Nadine (Author), Pernu, Tuomas K. |
| Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
| Jezik: | eng |
| Predmet: | |
| Online pristup: |
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1 Hrčak |