The conceptual impossibility of free will error theory

This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements—judgements regarding...

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Permalink: http://skupnikatalog.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001060263
Matična publikacija: European journal of analytic philosophy (Online)
15 (2019), 2 ; str. 99-119
Glavni autor: Latham, Andrew H. (Author)
Vrsta građe: e-članak
Jezik: eng
Predmet:
Online pristup: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.5
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