The conceptual impossibility of free will error theory
This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements—judgements regarding...
Permalink: | http://skupnikatalog.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001060263 |
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Matična publikacija: |
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) 15 (2019), 2 ; str. 99-119 |
Glavni autor: | Latham, Andrew H. (Author) |
Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
Jezik: | eng |
Predmet: | |
Online pristup: |
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.5 Hrčak |