Quine's poor Tom

Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument...

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Permalink: http://skupnikatalog.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001060261/Details
Matična publikacija: European journal of analytic philosophy (Online)
15 (2019), 1 ; str. 5-15
Glavni autor: Grøtvedt Haze, Tristan (Author)
Vrsta građe: e-članak
Jezik: eng
Predmet:
Online pristup: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
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520 |a Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part. 
653 0 |a Logika  |a Vjerovanje  |a Transparentnost 
653 1 |a Quine, Willard Van Orman 
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