Sampling individually fundamental simplexes as sets of players’ mixed strategies in finite noncooperative game for applicable approximate nash equilibrium situations with possible concessions

Permalink: http://skupnikatalog.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001031273/Details
Matična publikacija: Journal of information and organizational sciences
40 (2016), 1 ; str. 105-143
Glavni autor: Romanuke, Vadim (Author)
Vrsta građe: Članak
Jezik: eng
Predmet:
Online pristup: Elektronička verzija članka
LEADER 01013naa a2200265 i 4500
001 NSK01001031273
003 HR-ZaNSK
005 20190524093218.0
007 ta
008 190524s2016 ci | |0|| ||eng
035 |a (HR-ZaNSK)001031273 
040 |a HR-ZaNSK  |b hrv  |c HR-ZaNSK  |e ppiak 
042 |a croatica 
044 |a ci  |c hr 
080 1 |a 004  |2 2011 
080 1 |a 51  |2 2011 
100 1 |a Romanuke, Vadim  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Sampling individually fundamental simplexes as sets of players’ mixed strategies in finite noncooperative game for applicable approximate nash equilibrium situations with possible concessions /  |c Vadim Romanuke. 
300 |b Ilustr. 
504 |a Bibliografija: 140-143. 
653 0 |a Uzorkovanje  |a Aproksimacija  |a Nashova ravnoteža  |a Mapiranje 
773 0 |t Journal of information and organizational sciences  |x 1846-3312  |g 40 (2016), 1 ; str. 105-143  |w nsk.(HR-ZaNSK)000623898 
981 |b B08/16 
998 |a lblo1905 
856 4 1 |u https://hrcak.srce.hr/160009  |y Elektronička verzija članka